| I blame it on the mercury and lead in my diet |
[Jan. 30th, 2009|09:05 am] |
kittypuppy mentioned the book Ideology: A Very Short Introduction by Michael Freeden, which I thought looked interesting. Only two chapters into it, I'm already confused. So, smart LJ people, any help would be appreciated.
While I'm sure you're all familiar with the concept of hegemony, I'll quote a section from the book's discussion of Gramsci:
Ideological hegemony could be exercised by a dominant class, the bourgeoisie, not only through exerting state force but through various cultural means. Gramsci shifted ideology away from being solely a tool of the state. Ideology operated and was produced in civil society, the sphere of non-state individual and group activity. [Emphasis mine.] Here again the intellectuals surfaced as the major formulators and conductors of ideology and as non-governmental leaders wielding cultural authority. Their permeation of social life was characteristically based on the manufacturing of consent among the population at large, so that the masses would regard their own assent as spontaneous. Okay, I can go along with that, no problem. What troubles me is when he gets into Althusser. To wit:
Finally, Althusser's fifth input was that concrete individual subjects were made to serve as carriers of ideology, thus severing the inevitability of its link with class as proclaimed by earlier Marxists. For that reason, the very notion of ideology itself depended on the ideological concept of the subject--individuals constituted by ideology as bearers of consciousness, will, and agency. In other words, 'ideology' and 'subject' were mutually defining. Okay, stop right there. I don't get it, for it seems to me that Althusser is saying that ideology is self-defining, in that "ideology itself depended on the ideological concept of the subject</i>," but which came first, the chicken's ideology of the subject or the egg's ideology? What am I missing here?
Freeden explains:
If I acted as an individual who desired, say, to marry and have a fulfilling and lucrative career, I was putting my private life-purpose at the centre of my world, and others were recognizing my right to do that. But at the same time I was the product of an ideology that caused me to think of myself as a free agent whose fulfilment would be in a long-term, formalized relationship with another individual designated as a 'spouse', an in a profitable activity that would secure the means of purchasing the labour and products of others. I lived 'naturally' in such an ideology and believed that I was acting spontaneously and autonomously. There is an obvious implicit assumption here that I don't believe quite follows, and that's the idea of "others recognizing my right to do that." Only when following the dominant ideology will others respect that right, isn't that the case? When following a transgressive ideology, one that condones polygamy, for an example that's recently been in the news in America, then that "right" is not at all recognized. Also, I fail to see anything added here that wasn't covered by Gramsci. Yes, the internalization of the dominant ideology of the day means that we may perceive our actions as spontaneous and autonomous, but that's the function of hegemony as previously pointed out. The very assent of the masses will, of course, result in individual actions reflecting that assent, no?
Further:
Inasmuch as [ideology] is in us, we are not fully conscious of its effects. But if we are sufficiently astute, we can acknowledge that we identify each other through ideology, as individuals possessing certain features rather than others. That is a process of mutual recognition that brings order in its wake, such as 'you are a greengrocer, I am a customer', and, underpinning that, an awareness that is not always evident: 'we are both subject to the rules of the market'. The ambiguity of the term 'subject', Althusser argued, catches the essence of ideology beautifully. It refers to the free initiative of the individual, but also the the domination of the individual by a higher authority. Hmmm, sounds kind of like some sort of structuralist word-game to me, but let's ignore that for the moment. Is saying "you are a greengrocer" a statement of political ideology, as assumed in the given example. I'd argue that it isn't. Rather, it's a definition of function. (We could get into Sartre here and talk about being-for-others and being-for-itself, but perhaps that's beyond our scope.) And not only of function, but of function in and defined by a specific place and time. Later on, the greengrocer is husband, father, card cheat, what have you. While we can say that the jobs in which we function are a result of the dominant ideology, it's hard for me to see the performance of the job as an ideological statement in and of itself. Too, when saying that both actors are subject to the rules of the market, it's unclear to me, and not explained, why such an awareness is assumed not to be present. It's precisely this kind of assumption (in all of its elitist glory) that disturbs me so very much. And why, exactly, is the term "subject" ambiguous here? Again, unexplained, but from it profound leaps are made. Critical theory really likes to play fast and loose with language, doesn't it? And then tells us that language is necessarily ambiguous.
Freeden concludes:
For instance, being entrepreneurial, cowardly, caring--all these are particular features that our ideological imaginations deem important for one reason or another. These are all categories we apply in order to make sense of human actions. They all define the characteristics of individual subjects, thus placing them within a recognizable social network. They are all linked to practices of which we approve or disapprove, but which occur in the real world. Ultimately--and crucially--all these are permanent aspects of social life. Again, doesn't hegemony account for all of this?
So what am I missing here?
fitz (off to eat more paint chips) |
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